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Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have
attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of
individual strategists. In ﬁnite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without
mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players who have different adaptation rates. We show analytically
and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically
competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in ﬁnite-size
populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism.
When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of
fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefﬁciency for a player.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd.
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Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Cyclic competition among different phenotypes is often
found in nature. A minimal system of cyclic competition
consists of individuals of three phenotypes. In the so-called
rock-scissors-paper (RSP) dynamics, R beats S, S beats P,
and P beats R, hence no phenotype is entirely dominant.
Examples of natural RSP dynamics include tropical
marine ecosystems (Buss, 1980), color polymorphism of
natural lizards (Sinervo and Lively, 1996), vertebrate
ecosystems in high-arctic areas (Gilg et al., 2003), real
microbial communities of Escherichia coli (Kerr et al.,
2002), and various disease dynamics represented by
the susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible model or its
variants (Anderson and May, 1991).
Also in evolutionary game theory, cyclic competition
dynamics realized by three or more strategies often appear.
In social dilemma games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma,007 Elsevier Ltd.
i.2007.11.010
3812 2111.
ess: masuda@mist.i.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.cyclic competition often underlies the survival of altruistic
strategies subject to invasion by nonaltruistic strategies.
For example, if the players can take either unconditional
cooperation (ALLC) or unconditional defection (ALLD)
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, ALLD eventually prevails.
However, if discriminators that use reputation of other
players regarding the cooperation tendency are allowed,
ALLC, ALLD, and discriminators form an RSP cycle;
ALLD is stronger than ALLC, ALLC and discriminators
are neutral, and discriminators are stronger than ALLD
under certain conditions. Accordingly, these strategies
alternately prosper in the population, which implies
survival of altruistic players, namely, ALLC and discrimi-
nators (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b). Alternatively, if
players can choose not to play the public goods games,
such players called loners beat ALLD, ALLD beats ALLC,
and ALLC beats loners. The elicited RSP dynamics save
altruistic ALLC players, which would not survive without
loners (Hauert et al., 2002a,b; Semmann et al., 2003). In the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, a mixture of ALLC, ALLD,
and tit-for-tat (TFT) constitutes RSP dynamics so that
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2005). Finally, a population of different types of strategies,
each of which is based only on the last actions of players,
shows periodic and chaotic oscillations of population
densities associated with cyclic competition (Nowak and
Sigmund, 1993, 1989a,b; Brandt and Sigmund, 2006).
As illustrated by these examples, an important conse-
quence of cyclically competing evolutionary dynamics is
oscillations of population densities. Each strategy or
phenotype alternately becomes the majority until it is
devoured by its enemy. Oscillations are usually self-
destructive in small populations because the ﬁnite-size
effect usually drives the evolutionary dynamics to eventual
dominance of one of the competing phenotypes (Taylor
and Jonker, 1978; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Reich-
enbach et al., 2006). If the model represents an ecosystem,
dominance of one species implies a loss of biodiversity. In
social dilemma games, a situation in which one strategy
wins cyclic competition often implies a loss of altruism; in
many models, an altruistic strategy is relatively weak
compared to others and beats another strategy only barely
(Nowak and Sigmund, 1998b; Hauert et al., 2002b; Imhof
et al., 2005).
If oscillations are stabilized or suppressed, cyclically
competing strategies will coexist in a population. Oscilla-
tions can be suppressed by introduction of spatial structure
such as the square lattice (Hassell et al., 1991; Tainaka,
1993; Durrett and Levin, 1998; Frean and Abraham, 2001).
In line with this, oscillation amplitudes grow as the
underlying population structure transits from the regular
lattice to the well-mixed population by increasing the
number of long-range edges (Szabo´ et al., 2004; Ying et al.,
2007) (see Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007 for more references).
Alternatively, heterogeneous contact rates of individuals
suppress oscillations. In this scenario, hubs, namely,
individuals with many neighbors, are more susceptible to
invasion by their enemies, because hubs have many enemies
in the neighborhood than nonhubs on average. Then hubs
complete a state-transition cycle in shorter periods.
Mixture of individuals with different oscillation periods
abolishes the oscillation of the entire population density
(Masuda and Konno, 2006).
An implicit assumption made by these and many other
studies of cyclic competition (Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007) is that
a focal individual is invaded by each enemy neighbor
independently at a constant rate. For example, if a focal
individual is in state R and it has 10 neighbors, the state of
the focal individual is replaced by state P, which governs R,
at a rate proportional to the number of P among the 10
neighbors. In other words, each P individual preys on each
R neighbor independently at a constant rate. The
contributions of different P individuals add linearly. In
evolutionary games, however, the effect of each neighbor
adds linearly in the sense that the aggregated payoff of the
focal player is the linear sum of the payoff obtained
by playing with each neighbor. Then natural selection
operates on the aggregated payoff in a nonlinear manner.Here how one player elicits state transition of another
player is not straightforward.
In addition, suppression of oscillations by the hetero-
geneity mechanism requires that the number of contacts, or
neighbors, depends on individuals (Masuda and Konno,
2006). In the context of evolutionary games, heterogeneous
contact numbers also pave the way to increased altruism
(Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2006). In this
situation, enhanced cooperation stems from players with
many contacts, who earn more by participating in the game
more often. However, how to compare aggregated payoffs
of players with different numbers of participation is an
unresolved issue (Masuda, 2007).
In this work, we explore how oscillations in RSP
dynamics can be stabilized or suppressed in evolutionary
games. To avoid the problem of the heterogeneous number
of contact per player, we consider a well-mixed population
and assume that the adaptation rate, but not the contact
number, depends on players. Some players are quicker to
copy successful strategies than others. Such heterogeneous
adaptation rates are known to enhance cooperation in the
evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma on the regular lattices
and small-world networks (Kim et al., 2002; Szolnoki and
Szabo´, 2007). By extending the replicator dynamics, we
show that heterogeneous adaptation rates suppress oscilla-
tions of population densities in well-mixed populations. We
validate our theory by numerical simulations of the RSP
games and the public goods game with loners (Hauert
et al., 2002a,b).
2. Model
2.1. Replicator dynamics
We begin with the standard replicator dynamics.
Suppose that there are m possible phenotypes, which we
call strategies. The proportion of individuals, which we call
players, with strategy i in the population of n players is
denoted by xið1pipmÞ, where
P
i xi ¼ 1 and 0pxip1
(1pipm) are always satisﬁed. The ﬁtness of strategy i is
denoted by f i. The standard replicator dynamics are
represented by
dxi
dt
¼ xi f i 
Xm
j¼1
f jxj
 !
¼ xi
X
j
f i  f j
 
xj, ð1Þ
where we suppress the range of j when no confusion arises.
Players with strategy i increase in number at a rate
proportional to the excess of f i relative to the average
ﬁtness
P
j f jxj. Put another way, a player with strategy j
switches its strategy to strategy i of a randomly picked
opponent at a rate proportional to the ﬁtness difference
f i  f j, if f i  f jX0. If f i  f jo0, players with strategy i
may switch to strategy j. The players are interpreted to
form a well-mixed population.
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dxi
dt
¼ xi
X
j
Gðf i  f jÞxj  xi
X
j
Gðf j  f iÞxj , (2)
where
GðxÞ ¼
x ðxX0Þ;
0 ðxo0Þ:
(
(3)
The ﬁrst term of Eq. (2) represents the inﬂow of the
population density to strategy i and the second term
represents the outﬂow from i to other strategies. Note that
GðxÞ  GðxÞ ¼ x (4)
is satisﬁed.
2.2. Extended replicator dynamics
We extend the standard replicator dynamics by con-
sidering a heterogeneous population of players who differ
in the adaptation rate. For simplicity, we assume only two
adaptation rates bx and by. The corresponding proportions
of each strategy in two different subpopulations are
speciﬁed by xi and yi (1pipm), where
P
i xi ¼
P
i yi ¼ 1,
and 0pxi; yip1 (1pipm). In a homogeneous population,
the adaptation rate, which is common to all the players,
can be ignored by rescaling the time, as is evident in Eq. (1).
With two adaptation rates, the ratio bx=by is an essential
parameter that may alter dynamical consequences. Note
that the interaction rate is common to all the players, which
contrasts with Taylor and Nowak (2006). If one strategy is
more proﬁtable than another strategy irrespective of the
values of xi and yi (1pipm), players who adapt more
rapidly enjoy more beneﬁts. For example, in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma with ALLC and ALLD strategies only, every-
body in a well-mixed population will choose ALLD.
Rapidly adapting ALLC players switch to ALLD in early
stages to transiently exploit slowly adapting ALLC players.
However, under cyclic competition, it may not be proﬁt-
able to myopically follow apparently successful others. In a
long term, players may be better off by adapting slowly.
We assume that players differ only in adaptation rates
and that they are well mixed. Therefore, the total payoff
of a player with strategy i is equal to f i regardless of the
adaptation rate. We represent the extended replicator
dynamics as follows:
1
bx
dxi
dt
¼ xi f i 
X
j
f jxj
 !
þ yi
X
j
Gðf i  f jÞxj
 xi
X
j
Gðf j  f iÞyj, ð5Þ
1
by
dyi
dt
¼ yi f i 
X
j
f jyj
 !
þ xi
X
j
Gðf i  f jÞyj
 yi
X
j
Gðf j  f iÞxj. ð6ÞIn Eq. (5), the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side represents
the competition within players who have adaptation rate
bx. This part is identical to the standard replicator
dynamics. The second term represents the transition
from strategy j to strategy i as a result of imitating a
player with the different adaptation rate, that is, by.
Players with strategy j and adaptation rate bx, whose
density is xj , switch to strategy i when they meet a player
with strategy i and adaptation rate by. The transition
rate is proportional to Gðf i  f jÞ. Note that the transition
from j to i such that players with strategy i and adaptation
rate bx are imitated is taken care of by the ﬁrst term.
The third term represents the rate at which players
with strategy i and adaptation rate bx switch to strategy j
when they meet a player with strategy j and adaptation
rate by. Eq. (6) can be interpreted similarly. Eqs. (5)
and (6) guarantee
P
i dxi=dt ¼ 0 and
P
i dyi=dt ¼ 0, so
that the number of players in each subpopulation is
conserved.
Cyclic competition often yields coexistence of all
the relevant strategies. Interested in this phenomenon, we
focus on interior equilibria, which satisfy xi40 (1p8ipm).
In the standard replicator dynamics shown in Eq. (1),
suppose that the total payoff for each strategy f i
is linear in x1; x2; . . . ; xm, as is the case when the
payoff is deﬁned by a payoff matrix. Then the interior
equilibrium is unique and determined from f 1 ¼ f 2 ¼    ¼
f m and
P
i xi ¼ 1 (Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998). For the extended replicator dynamics, the
interior equilibrium is not unique even when f i is linear
in the density of each strategy x1 þ y1, x2 þ y2; . . .,
and xm þ ym. Indeed, any conﬁguration that satisﬁes
f 1 ¼ f 2 ¼    ¼ f m,
P
i xi ¼ 1, and
P
i yi ¼ 1 leads to
dxi=dt ¼ dyi=dt ¼ 0 in Eqs. (5) and (6) for G given in
Eq. (3). Because there are 2m unknown variables and m þ 1
equations, the equilibrium is underdetermined. Only the
proportion of each strategy with different adaptation rates
pooled, namely, xi þ yi, is determined by the equilibrium
condition.
To avoid this ambiguity, we introduce a realistic
assumption for G. Because of bounded cognitive ability
and stochastic environments, players may mimic strategies
of unsuccessful others with small probabilities. This
factor can be implemented by allowing GðxÞ40 for
xo0 (Blume, 1993; Nowak et al., 2004; Ohtsuki et al.,
2006; Traulsen et al., 2006). More speciﬁcally, we
assume that G is any differentiable function that satisﬁes
G0ðxÞ40, limx!1 GðxÞ ¼ 0, and Eq. (4). This assumption
implies that limx!1 GðxÞ=x ¼ limx!1 ðx þ GðxÞÞ=x ¼ 1
and G0ð0Þ ¼ 1
2
.
Then, it is straightforward to see that the interior
equilibrium in the case of the linear payoff is uniquely
given by f 1 ¼ f 2 ¼    ¼ f m,
P
i xi ¼ 1,
P
i yi ¼ 1, and xi ¼
yi (1pipm). The uniqueness can be shown as follows.
If f 1 ¼ f 2 ¼    ¼ f m does not hold at an interior
equilibrium, there exists an i0 such that f i04
P
j f jxj
and f i04
P
j f jyj at this point. For this i0, summation of
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0 ¼ 1
bx
dxi0
dt
þ 1
by
dyi0
dt
¼ xi0 f i0 
X
j
f jxj
 !
þ yi0 f i0 
X
j
f jyj
 !
40, ð7Þ
which is a contradiction. Therefore, f 1 ¼ f 2 ¼    ¼ f m
holds. Then the ﬁrst terms in the right-hand sides of
Eqs. (5) and (6) vanish, and we obtain xi ¼ yi (1pipm).
3. Analysis of the RSP games
We consider the symmetric RSP game whose ﬁtness f i is
speciﬁed via the following payoff matrix:
A ¼
0 a2 b3
b1 0 a3
a1 b2 0
0
B@
1
CA (8)
(Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Each player
can take one of the three strategies (m ¼ 3), and the row
player and the column player correspond to the focal
player and the opponent, respectively.
The unique interior equilibrium of the extended repli-
cator dynamics is given by
x1
x2
x3
0
B@
1
CA ¼
y1
y2
y3
0
B@
1
CA ¼ 1
S
a2a3 þ a3b2 þ b2b3
a1a3 þ a1b3 þ b1b3
a1a2 þ a2b1 þ b1b2
0
B@
1
CA, (9)
where S is the normalization constant. In the standard
replicator dynamics, this equilibrium is asymptotically
stable when a1a2a3ob1b2b3 (Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). If a1a2a34b1b2b3, the equilibrium is
unstable, and in a ﬁnite population, the population density
oscillates with ever increasing amplitudes until the popula-
tion consists entirely of a single strategy. The relation
a1a2a3 ¼ b1b2b3 stipulates a borderline situation in which
the interior equilibrium is neutrally stable.
By a one-to-one mapping of the population density
vector, the payoff matrix A can be transformed to the
following form (Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998):
A0 ¼
0 a2 a1 þ 
a2 þ  0 a3
a1 a3 þ  0
0
B@
1
CA. (10)
Now, the asymptotic stability of the interior equilibrium is
equivalent to 40.
To show that heterogeneous adaptation rates stabilize
the interior equilibrium, we even simplify Eq. (10) by
setting a1 ¼ a2 ¼ a3 ¼ 1 (Zeeman, 1980)
A00 ¼
0 1 1þ 
1þ  0 1
1 1þ  0
0
B@
1
CA. (11)The interior equilibrium is now given by
x1
x2
x3
0
B@
1
CA ¼
y1
y2
y3
0
B@
1
CA ¼ 1
3
1
1
1
0
B@
1
CA, (12)
which is asymptotically stable if and only if 40. When
 ¼ 0, the equilibrium is neutrally stable, with A00 deﬁning a
zerosum game. The standard replicator dynamics for  ¼ 0
becomes the most famous RSP dynamics
dx1
dt
¼ x1ðx3  x2Þ, ð13Þ
dx2
dt
¼ x2ðx1  x3Þ, ð14Þ
dx3
dt
¼ x3ðx2  x1Þ. ð15Þ
For A00 given in Eq. (11), we obtain
f 1 ¼ ð1þ Þðx3 þ y3Þ  ðx2 þ y2Þ, ð16Þ
f 2 ¼ ð1þ Þðx1 þ y1Þ  ðx3 þ y3Þ, ð17Þ
f 3 ¼ ð1þ Þðx2 þ y2Þ  ðx1 þ y1Þ. ð18Þ
We linearize the extended replicator dynamics around
the interior equilibrium by setting xi ¼ xi þ Dxi, yi ¼
yi þ Dyi (1pip3), where Dxi and Dyi are small. Using
Dx1 þ Dx2 þ Dx3 ¼ Dy1 þ Dy2 þ Dy3 ¼ 0 and G0ð0Þ ¼ 12,
we obtain
1
bx
dDx1
dt
¼ 1
3
þ Dx1
 
ð1þ ÞðDx3 þ Dy3Þ  ðDx2 þ Dy2Þ
h
 ðDx1 þ Dx2 þ Dx3Þ 

3
ðDy1 þ Dy2 þ Dy3Þ
i
þ 1
3
þ Dy1
 X
j
½Gð0Þ þ G0ð0ÞðDf 1  Df jÞ
1
3
þ Dxj
 
 1
3
þ Dx1
 X
j
½Gð0Þ þ G0ð0ÞðDf j  Df 1Þ
1
3
þ Dyj
 
¼  2ð1þ Þ
3
 Gð0Þ
 
Dx1  2ð2þ Þ
3
Dx2
þ  2ð1þ Þ
3
þ Gð0Þ
 
Dy1 
2ð2þ Þ
3
Dx2, ð19Þ
where Df i is perturbation of the steady state f i that originates
from Dx1, Dx2, and Dx3. By doing similar calculations for
Dx2, Dy1, and Dy2, we obtain the linear dynamics around the
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dt
Dx1
Dx2
Dy1
Dy2
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA ¼
ð1þ ÞBx  Cx ð2þ ÞBx ð1þ ÞBx þ Cx ð2þ ÞBx
ð2þ ÞBx Bx  Cx ð2þ ÞBx Bx þ Cx
ð1þ ÞBy þ Cy ð2þ ÞBy ð1þ ÞBy  Cy ð2þ ÞBy
ð2þ ÞBy By þ Cy ð2þ ÞBy By  Cy
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA
Dx1
Dx2
Dy1
Dy2
0
BBBB@
1
CCCCA, (20)where Bx ¼ 2bx=3, By ¼ 2by=3, Cx ¼ bxGð0Þ, and Cy ¼
byGð0Þ. Noting that BxCy ¼ ByCx, we obtain the following
eigenvalue equation:
l4 þ ½2ðCx þ CyÞ þ ðBx þ ByÞl3
þ ð3þ 3þ 2ÞðB2x þ B2yÞ þ ðCx þ CyÞ2 þ ð6þ 6þ 2ÞBxBy
h
þðBxCx þ ByCy þ 3BxCy þ 3ByCxÞ
i
l2
þ½6ð2þ Þ2BxByðCx þ CyÞ þ 4ðBx þ ByÞCxCyl
þ12ð2þ Þ2BxByCxCy ¼ 0. ð21Þ
The interior equilibrium is stable if all the solutions of
Eq. (21) have negative real parts. The Routh–Hurwitz
criteria dictate that all the eigenvalues of Eq. (21) are
negative if and only if the four principal minors of a matrix
calculated from the coefﬁcients of Eq. (21) are all positive. To
the ﬁrst order of , the principal minors are calculated as
jH1j ¼ 2ðCx þ CyÞ þ ðBx þ ByÞ, ð22Þ
jH2j ¼ 6ð1þ ÞðBx  ByÞ2ðCx þ CyÞ þ 2ðCx þ CyÞ3
þ 3ðBx þ ByÞ3
þ ðBx þ ByÞð3C2x þ 10CxCy þ 3C2yÞ, ð23Þ
jH3j ¼ 144ð1þ 2ÞðBx  ByÞ2BxByðCx þ CyÞ2
þ 48ð1þ ÞBxByðCx þ CyÞ2ðCx  CyÞ2
þ 72ðBx þ ByÞ3BxByðCx þ CyÞ
þ 24ðBx þ ByÞBxByðCx þ CyÞð2C2x þ 3CxCy þ 2CyÞ2
þ 24ðBx þ ByÞðBx  ByÞ2ðCx þ CyÞCxCy
þ 8ðBx þ ByÞðCx þ CyÞ3CxCy, ð24Þ
jH4j ¼ 48ð1þ ÞBxByCxCyjH3j. ð25Þ
These relations hold whenever 40, that is, when the
interior equilibrium is stable even without heterogeneous
adaptation rates. When o0, the interior equilibrium is
unstable with homogeneous adaptation rates. In accor-
dance, jH3jo0 holds when Bx ¼ By40, Cx ¼ Cy40, and
o0. To make jH3j positive for o0, the heterogeneity
quantiﬁed by ðBx  ByÞ2 and ðCx  CyÞ2, must be large
enough to compensate the negative contribution of the last
four  terms of Eq. (24) to jH3j.
Although Eqs. (22)–(25) are valid for inﬁnitesimally
small jj, they are exact when  ¼ 0. In this case, the
standard replicator dynamics have a neutrally stable
interior equilibrium (Zeeman, 1980; Hofbauer and Sig-
mund, 1998). Actually, jH3j ¼ 0 holds when Bx ¼ By40,Cx ¼ Cy40, and  ¼ 0. Eqs. (22)–(25), imply that the
asymptotic stability is equivalent to BxaBy and CxaCy,
or equivalently, bxaby, in addition to bx40 and by40.
These analytical results indicate that heterogeneous adap-
tation rates stabilize the interior equilibrium.
4. Numerical results
In this section, we perform individual-based numerical
simulations in which players are involved in evolutionary
games with cyclic competition. As a rule of thumb, when the
population size is of the order of 100 or smaller, the ﬁnite-
size effect tends to make amplitudes of oscillatory popula-
tion densities explode. We show that, even in this case,
introduction of heterogeneous adaptation rates prohibits
the monopoly by a single strategy, which would follow
unrestricted growths of oscillation amplitudes. As a result,
different competing strategies can coexist. In the following
numerical simulations, we assume n ¼ 200 players.
4.1. RSP games
Consider that players are involved in the RSP game
whose payoff matrix is given by Eq. (11). Each player takes
one of the three strategies. Initially, players select each
strategy randomly and independently with probability 1
3
.
Any pair of players is engaged in the game with probability
0.5 so that each player is matched with 0:5ðn  1Þ ¼ 99:5
other players on average.
In accordance with the replicator dynamics, players with
larger accumulated payoffs can disseminate their strategies
more successfully. We pick 40 pairs of players randomly
from the population and denote one such pair by i and j.
Only player i is assumed to be subject to strategy update in
this pairing. Player i copies player j’s strategy with
probability biðf j  f iÞ, where bi is the adaptation rate of
player i. If f i4f j, no imitation occurs. This update rule is
equivalent to the replicator dynamics with the piecewise
linear G given in Eq. (3). Although we required smooth G
for formulating extended replicator dynamics, here we use
the piecewise linear G for simplicity. The average adapta-
tion rate is set equal to b ¼ 0:5=n ¼ 0:0025, and the
adaptation rate of player i, or bi, is distributed according
to the uniform density on b 1 Db
 	
;b 1þ Db
 	
 
, inde-
pendently for different players. As Db increases, the
population becomes heterogeneous.
For  ¼ 0, the interior equilibrium is neutrally, but not
asymptotically, stable in the standard replicator dynamics.
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Fig. 1 for three values of heterogeneity Db. In Fig. 1, only
the proportions of players with strategy 1 (ﬁrst-row players
in Eq. (11)) are shown for visibility. In reality, three
subpopulations, respectively, corresponding to strategies
1–3 alternately prosper due to cyclic competition.
When Db ¼ 0 (Fig. 1(A)), all the players share the same
adaptation rate (bi ¼ b) as in the standard replicator
dynamics. Owing to the ﬁnite-size effect, the oscillation
grows in amplitude until one strategy dominates the
population after some oscillation cycles. The proportion of
strategy 1 presented in the ﬁgure reaches 0 or 1 depending on
initial conditions and stochasticity in strategy updating. As
the adaptation rate becomes heterogeneous, explosion of the
oscillation amplitude tends to be suppressed. When Db ¼ 0:4
(Fig. 1(B)), oscillations persist for much longer time than
when Db ¼ 0 (Fig. 1(A)). With more heterogeneity, the
oscillation persists even longer and the oscillation amplitude
becomes smaller, as shown in Fig. 1(C) for Db ¼ 0:8.
Precisely speaking, the theory predicts damping oscillations
for heterogeneous adaptation rates, but not reverberating
ripples apparent in Figs. 1(B) and (C). There are many factors
that could contribute to this discrepancy: the nonsmooth G,0
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Fig. 1. Evolutionary simulations of the zerosum RSP game in ﬁnite population
rate is (A) absent (Db ¼ 0), (B) intermediate (Db ¼ 0:4), and (C) large (Db ¼
strategies is shown in each panel. The horizontal lines indicate 1
3
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Fig. 2. Evolutionary simulations of the nonzerosum RSP game in ﬁnite popu
adaptation rate Db is equal to (A) 0, (B) 0.4, and (C) 0.8.more than two values of adaptation rates, stochasticity
introduced by random encountering and updating of ran-
domly selected players, and small n. Because the aim in the
numerical simulations is to show suppression of oscillations by
heterogeneity, we do not explore this subtle discrepancy.
For  ¼ 0:1, the interior equilibrium is unstable in the
standard replicator dynamics. In a homogeneous popula-
tion, two of the three strategies are eradicated in an early
stage (Fig. 2(A); Db ¼ 0). Even with some heterogeneity in
the adaptation rate, the oscillation ends up with explosion
(Fig. 2(B); Db ¼ 0:4). At this level of heterogeneity,
coexistence generally lasts longer than the homogeneous
case, whereas its duration depends pretty much on
numerical runs (results not shown). With stronger hetero-
geneity (Fig. 2(C); Db ¼ 0:8), three strategies coexist stably
with a high probability.
4.2. Public goods game with voluntary participation
As another numerical example, we examine the public
goods game, which is a type of the multiperson Prisoner’s
Dilemma. We assume that NðonÞ randomly selected
players form a group. In the standard public goods game,00 7500 10000
ration
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refrain from donation. The donated amount is multiplied
by r and divided equally by the N players. When r41,
donation is a prosocial action because it increases the
aggregated beneﬁt of the group by proportion r  1.
However, a player always earns more by not donating,
which is a social dilemma. In an evolutionary framework,
the public goods game is repeated with different random
groups in one generation. Then, the players with higher
accumulated payoffs have more chances to disseminate
their strategies. Without further assumptions, altruistic
donation is completely overridden by defection.
Incorporation of another strategy called loner opens the
way to survival of cooperators (Hauert et al., 2002a,b). A
loner does not participate in the game, and it gains the side
payoff s40. The key assumption is that it is better not to
play than to be in a group of defectors. If there are N  S
loners in a group, the other S players play the public goods
game. If there are nc cooperators among S players given
SX2, the payoffs for a cooperator, defector, and loner, are
equal to f c ¼ 1þ rnc=S, f d ¼ rnc=S, and f l ¼ s, respec-
tively. If S ¼ 1, the single player constituting the group
behaves like a loner because there is nobody to play the
game with.
With sor  1, it is better to stay in a group of
cooperators than not to participate. Therefore, defectors
dominate cooperators, as before, and loners dominate
defectors, and cooperators dominate loners, which implies
the RSP relation. According to the meanﬁeld analysis with
the standard replicator equations, the coexistence equili-
brium is neutrally stable (Hauert et al., 2002a,b). The stable
oscillation of the population density numerically shown for
n ¼ 5000 (Hauert et al., 2002a) may collapse in small
populations. Oscillations can be stabilized by placing
players on the regular lattice (Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002)
or small-world networks with sufﬁcient spatial structure
(Szabo´ and Vukov, 2004; Wu et al., 2005) (see Szabo´ and
Fa´th, 2007 for more references). Here we are concerned to
an alternative: the heterogeneity mechanism.0
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Fig. 3. Evolutionary simulations of the public goods game with voluntary p
b ¼ 0:005, and (A) Db ¼ 0, (B) Db ¼ 0:4, and (C) Db ¼ 0:8. The proportions
dashed lines, and thick solid lines, respectively.We perform numerical simulations with n ¼ 200, N ¼ 5,
r ¼ 3, and s ¼ 1. Initially, each player selects each strategy
with probability 13. The generation payoff of player i is
determined as the summation of the payoff after 2000
rounds of group formation. As in the numerical simula-
tions of the RSP game (Section 4.1), 40 players are subject
to strategy update at the end of each generation. The
average adaptation rate is set equal to b ¼ 0:2N=n ¼ 0:005.
The results are shown in Fig. 3 for different degrees of
heterogeneity in the adaptation rate. In each panel,
cooperators (thin solid lines) are devoured by defectors
(thin dashed lines), defectors are devoured by loners (thick
solid lines), and loners are devoured by cooperators. This
completes one RSP cycle. When the adaptation rate is
homogeneous as in the standard replicator dynamics, the
oscillation expands due to the ﬁnite-size effect. Two of the
three strategies ﬁnally disappear (Fig. 3(A); Db ¼ 0).
Unless r is so large that loners are not needed for the
survival of cooperators, loners are relatively stronger than
cooperators and defectors without violating the RSP
relationship (Hauert et al., 2002a,b). Accordingly, the
strategy that dominates ﬁnite populations are usually
loners, which contrasts to the case of the RSP game. When
the adaptation rate is heterogeneous (Fig. 3(B); Db ¼ 0:4),
oscillations typically last for longer time. With a stronger
degree of heterogeneity (Fig. 3(C); Db ¼ 0:8), oscillations
are more stable. In this way, heterogeneity promotes
survival of cooperators in small populations of players in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
5. Discussion
5.1. Summary of the results
We have analyzed evolutionary game dynamics of
cyclically competing strategies (or phenotypes) with hetero-
geneous adaptation rates. We have shown analytically
and numerically that such heterogeneity suppresses oscilla-
tions of the density of each strategy and dominance of00 7500 10000
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Fig. 4. Schematic of trajectories of (A) symmetric and (B) heavily skewed
RSP dynamics.
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evolutionary dynamics with cyclic competition. In a game
such that a speciﬁc strategy is stable with a large attractive
basin, players with large adaptation rates shift to the
lucrative strategy quickly. Then they can transiently exploit
conservative players with small adaptation rates. A larger
adaptation rate is better in this situation. However, in
games with cyclic competition, an obvious hierarchy of
strategies is absent. Then conservative players contribute to
diversiﬁcation of a population without really sacriﬁcing
their own beneﬁts.
The assumption that different players have different
adaptation rates seems realistic. Therefore, our results
imply that cyclic competition does not necessarily lead to
apparent oscillations of population densities or dominance
of particular strategies, which many analytical models
predict. The other way round, an ordinary situation where
three or more types of strategists stably coexist does not
exclude operation of cyclic competition that is not weak.
Generally speaking, evolutionary dynamics in ﬁnite
populations deviate from theoretical predictions for inﬁnite
populations (Nowak et al., 2004). In homogeneous
populations, RSP dynamics that show stable oscillations
in inﬁnite populations usually show unstable oscillations in
ﬁnite populations, so that all but one phenotypes will
disappear (Reichenbach et al., 2006). In the context of
evolutionary games, altruistic strategies that are relatively
weak in the RSP relation are expelled in ﬁnite populations,
even if they can survive in inﬁnite populations. The public
goods game with voluntary participation investigated in
Section 4.2 is such an example. Heterogeneity saves rare
strategies particularly in small populations (up to the order
of 100 players).
5.2. Oscillations induced by mutation
In addition to heterogeneous adaptation rates, there are
mechanisms that sustain rare strategies in evolutionary
dynamics with cyclic competition. One is spatial structure
of contact networks, as explained in Section 1 (Hassell
et al., 1991; Tainaka, 1993; Durrett and Levin, 1998; Frean
and Abraham, 2001; Szabo´ and Hauert, 2002; Szabo´ et al.,
2004; Szabo´ and Vukov, 2004; Wu et al., 2005; Ying et al.,
2007). Another important mechanism is mutation. No
strategy dies out in the presence of mutation because
mutation decreases the proportions of major strategies and
increases those of rare strategies. Actually, mutation
establishes oscillations and is a key to altruism in the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with cyclically competing
three strategies, that is, ALLC, ALLD, and TFT (Imhof
et al., 2005).
We have neglected mutation in this work. Mutation-
induced oscillations, which imply coexistence of multiple
strategies, and oscillations by heterogeneous adaptation
rates are consistent. When mutation creates an oscillation
in otherwise nonoscillatory evolutionary dynamics, the
amplitude of an oscillation is fairly large because amutation rate is typically small. A large oscillation
amplitude implies that, in most of the time, the proportion
of at least one strategy is very small (Imhof et al., 2005).
With this case included, heterogeneity lessens the oscilla-
tion amplitude so that the proportion of each strategy does
not ﬂuctuate so much in time.
5.3. Heavily skewed cyclic competition makes coexistence
difficult
To test our theory, we examined two numerical models
in Section 4. One is the standard RSP game that directly
corresponds to the analytical model in Section 3. The other
is the public goods game with voluntary participation
(Hauert et al., 2002a,b). There are other evolutionary
games in which oscillations derived from cyclic competition
are observed. Examples include the Prisoner’s Dilemma
with a mixture of different memory-one strategies (Nowak
and Sigmund, 1989a,b, 1993), a seminal model of indirect
reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998a,b), and the
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with misimplementation of
the action (Brandt and Sigmund, 2006). In these models,
three or more strategies including altruistic strategies
alternately prosper in inﬁnite well-mixed populations. By
additional numerical simulations, these dynamics were
examined with 200pnp1000 and heterogeneous adapta-
tion rates. However, it was impossible to stabilize the
oscillatory dynamics with the ranges of parameter values
probed (results not shown).
We conjecture that this failure is caused by the extreme
asymmetry inherent in these RSP dynamics. To illustrate,
suppose a population with homogeneous adaptation rates.
By symmetric RSP dynamics, we mean those deﬁned by the
payoff matrix given in Eq. (11). The corresponding
dynamics of the population densities are schematically
depicted in Fig. 4(A) so that the interior equilibrium is
located in the center of the simplex. Each point in the
simplex speciﬁes a density proﬁle of different strategies.
A point close to the corner labeled 1, for example,
corresponds to a population that contains relatively many
players with strategy 1. The symmetric or quasi symmetric
RSP dynamics are often employed in the context of
interacting particle systems as well as evolutionary games
(Tainaka, 1993; Durrett and Levin, 1998; Frean and
Abraham, 2001; Szabo´ et al., 2004; Reichenbach et al.,
2006; Ying et al., 2007). An example of heavily asymmetric,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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complete a cycle, the trajectory has to proceed through a
narrow canal between the interior equilibrium and the
heteroclinic path on which only strategies 2 and 3 exist (the
bottom line of the triangle). Accordingly, the proportion of
strategy 1 is close to zero for some signiﬁcant time in each
cycle. Such heavily skewed RSP dynamics are identiﬁed in
literature (Nowak and Sigmund, 1989a,b) and may be
widely found in evolutionary games.
Because trajectories for a population of small to
intermediate size accompany considerable ﬂuctuation, it
likely hits the heteroclinic path so that the rare strategy
(strategy 1 in Fig. 4(B)) perishes. If the location of the
interior equilibrium and trajectories derived from an
inﬁnite-population theory are extremely skewed, oscilla-
tory dynamics will not be realized in ﬁnite populations.
Because the heterogeneous adaptation rate does not change
the position of the equilibrium (see Section 3 and Masuda
and Konno, 2006), heterogeneity does not widen the canal.
Although mutation kicks trajectories that have fallen onto
the heteroclinic path back to the interior of the simplex, the
rare strategy is perpetually subject to extinction. The
heterogeneity mechanism discovered here will work out for
RSP dynamics that are not extremely skewed.
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